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ANTHROPOLOGY

Compensatory Blood-Brotherhood: A Comparative Analysis
of Institutionalized Friendship in Two African Societies 1
JAMES L. GIBBS, JR.
University of Minnesota
!NTROD':CT~ON: Blood-brotherhood with its ac::companymg exotic ntual has long caught the imagination of both
anthropological and lay observers. Descriptions of the
ritual pact from widely separated non-literate societies
portray a relationship of recurring similarity. 2 Behavior
between blood brothers involves the intimacy, warmth
and reciprocity that is customarily associated with "friendship," but - paradoxically - it is also marked by role expectations that are extraordinarily clear-cut, formalized
and compelling.
The fact that blood-brotherhood is so strongly institutionalized 3 sets it apart from ordinary friendship and
suggests that it plays a particularly crucial role in the
functioning of individuals and/ or social organizations. It
is ~ot surprising, then, that hypotheses purporting to explam blood-brotherhood are both psychological and soci?logical. Psrchologi~al hypotheses view the relationship
~n terms of its functions for the individual by noting the
impact of the ritualized friendship on intra-psychic process~s. K_ardi~er suggests that friends, through the process
of 1dent1ficat10n, serve as ego ideals. Erickson notes that
the! play _a part in establishing and defining ego modes,
while Sulhvan and the learning theorists have focused on
the socialization process and noted that friends influence
the internalization of values and roles. Sociological hypotheses have viewed blood-brotherhood in terms of its
functions for the social system rather than the individual.
Three such functions have been noted: the instrumental
the integrative, and the role stabilizing. 4
'
Most of the sociological theorists have ignored the
~act that' ritual brotherhood is a type of friendship and
1s, therefore, an individual as well as a societal phenomenon. Similarly, most psychological theorists ignore the
fact that the behavior patterns of blood-brotherhood are
highly formalized and widespread and, therefore, reflect
social pressures and shared needs.
There is meri! in both positions, of course, and they
should be combmed. Thus, an hypothesis which satisfactorily explains the phenomena of blood-brotherhood
must note: ( 1) that there may be several types of bloodbrotherhood generated by different .social structures and
serving different functions. (2) utilize the concept of
modal personality to explain the presence of recurrent,
shared personality needs which can be traced to social
structure and are met by ritualized friendship as an institutionalized relationship. In short, what is needed is an
hypothesis which deals with blood-brotherhood in terms
of both personality functions and social functions.
This presupposes a taxonomy of types of social structures and, ideally, a study of ritualized friendship in each
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type of society. 5' This is beyond the scope of the present
paper, but we would like to examine blood-brotherhood
a_s it is found in one type of kin-oriented society, the
tightly structured society.
THE TIGHTLY STRUCTURED SocIETY: John Embree
( 1950) in his insightful paper comparing Thai and Japanese social .structures first made a distinction between
loosely structured societies where "considerable variation
of individual behavior is sanctioned" versus tightly structured societies where there is a greater emphasis on "the
importance of observing reciprocal rights and duties in
different situations . . ." (Embree 19 50: 182) . This dichotomy was given more precise definition by Bryce
Ryan and Murray Strauss (1954) who define the loosely
structured society in terms of the ego-group relationship
and the nature of normative regulation. 6
There are several dimensions of the tightness-looseness
duality which the present writer would like to add to
both previous characterizations. They are: ( 1) the number of roles which a society makes available; (2) the
basis of role allocation; (3) the kind and degree of
sanctions used to maintain role conformity, and ( 4) the
consequences of these three.
Accordingly, I define a "tight" 7 society· as one in
which there is not a wide range of roles to select from,
and where roles are primarily ascribed, rather than
achieved. Moreover, there is not much tolerance of individual variation in role performance, and deviance in
role performance is· regularly met by clear-cut social
sanctions. In a loose society, there is a greater range of
available roles, and roles are more preponderantly
achieved than in a tight society. A greater variation in
role. performance is allowed, and deviance in role performance is not regularly met with precise sanctions.
Given this definition of tight and loose societies, it is
possible to further specify the nature of the duality by
evaluating particular features of social organization and
kinship systems in terms of their contribution to tightness and looseness (Gibbs, 1960). Here, the concern is
with tight societies only and one may simply list (see
Chart I) those features which contribute to tightness in
one of three ways: ( 1) through defining normative expectations either by unequivocally allocating roles o~ by
clearly stating norms; (2) by punishing deviance from
norms, and (3) by rewarding conformity to norms.
The rationale for including each specific social organizational feature is also noted in another study (Gibbs,
1960), but the kind of reasoning employed can be briefly
indicated here. 8 For example, the use of a hierarchial,
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ascriptive principle such as primogeniture unequivocally
allocates roles; and a feature like preferential marriage
clearly states norms and both, therefore, contribute to
tightness. Similarly, supernatural sanctions against adultery punish deviance while the presence of elective office
based on moral matrimonial behavior can be viewed as
rewarding conformity (see Chart I).
1. Structural and Functional Schema of the Tightly Structured Society*

CHART

Social Function

1. Defines normative expectations (by unequivocally
allocating or stating
norms) and/ or
2. punishes deviance from
norms
3. rewards conformity to
norms

4. tension release

Features of Social Organization

1. hereditary caste system or
class structure
2. hereditary offices
3. formal age grades
4. congruence of rules of descent and residence
5. primogeniture, ultimogeniture
and other fixed patterns of
inheritance and succession
6. group-centered vs. ego-centered kinship terminology
7. stress on age criterion in kinship terminology
8. preferential marriage
9. sororate and/or levirate
10. lineage determination of betrothal
11. rigidly structured sibling behavior
12. joking and avoidance relationships
13. severe sanctions against
adultery
14. difficult and rare divorce
15. ancestor worship
1. sibling rivalry

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

witchcraft
sorcery
homosexuality
transvestism
psycho-somatic symptoms (including hysteria)
7. some forms of suicide
8. assodation with an anti-social
purpose
9. a strong belief in Fate or
similar external causal agent

,:, This schema includes the relevant features of social organization of the societies analyzed in the present paper and also
includes pertinent features of social organization found in other
tightly structured societies. All of these features will not be
found in a single tightly structured society for, while each can
be shown to be contributory to tightness of structure, the presence of each and every one is not necessary for structural tightness to result.

A feature of the tight society only tangentially noted in
previous discussions is the patterned behavioral consequences of a psychological nature. It is a truism of social
science to say that complete institutionalization of behavior within a society is impossible. But, the tight society values this impossible goal highly. In its provision of
few role choices, its rigid allocation of roles, and stress
on conformity in role performance, it allows little room
for the expression of individual differences in biologically
given temperament or social temperament.
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The result is a high degree of deviance. Following
Dollard and Miller, one could say that the frustration
which is an inherent part of a tight society leads to aggression, or more precisely, patterned social deviance which
is also a part of such a society. This may take many
expressions: psychosomatic trends, such as hysteria; degree and form of suicide; nature and degree of other
forms of deviance, such as transvestism; and forms of
expression of aggression, such as crime, sorcery and
witchcraft (see Chart I).
It is not simply the presence of one of these features
which marks the tight society, but its incidence, its occurrence in combination with other such features, and
that it is often institutionalized as a possible, but somewhat disvalued alternative. In other words, there is what
Florence Kluckhohn (1950:383) has aptly termed "variance," as opposed to deviance.
The societally generated strains of a tight society which
are manifested in such variant role patterns are a part of
the modal personality type or types basic to such a society, and one cannot explain institutionalized expressions
of such strain without resort to the modal personality
concept. However, as Inkeles and Levinson (1954) have
pointed out, "modal personality" should be used ideally
to refer to a constellation of psychological or personality
traits as they have been delineated on the basis of detailed study of numbers of living individuals of a given
culture. For the construction of a modally distributed
personality type based on the study of cultural institutions rather than individuals, the study of non-psychological traits in individuals, or the study of psychological
features in only a few individuals, an alternative term
should be used. I suggest the term inferred modal personality and will use it in the following discussion of
blood-brotherhood in two African societies.
To test the hypothesis that the tight society produces
a type of ritualized friendship with special functions, descriptions of blood-brotherhood and other ethnographic
data from Tanala and Azande have been analyzed. These
two societies were selected because they have unusually
rich reports on blood-brotherhood, although the fullness
of the ethnographic reports is not completely comparable in other respects. The analysis follows:
TANALA AND AZANDE AS TIGHTLY STRUCTURED SOCIETIES: 1. The Tanala, comprising several "tribes," 9 are

patrilineal agriculturalists living on the mountainous plateau of Madagascar, who number 200,000 (Murdock
1959:217). Basic ethnograpic information on the group
was recorded by Linton (1933) ,10 and these same data
have formed the basis of psycho-cultural interpretation
by Kardiner (1939:291-354).
Tanala society is clearly tightly structured. It is characterized by the ascriptive allocation by birth of class
roles (Linton 1933: 138) and political roles (Linton
193 3: 14 7). Family roles, too, are ascriptively filled by
birth order - notably in a modified primogeniture for
the inheritance of property.11 Underlying these patterns
is a focus on hierarchial relationships which is also mirrored in intra-familial behavior, kinship terms, 12 marriage
proscriptions, 13 class structure, 14 and religion.
The Minnesota Academy of Science

This hierarchical focus gives the family a patriarchical,
authoritarian flavor. The father's control is "absolute"
(Kardiner 1939:260) and elaborate etiquette reflects his
separate and superior status vis-a-vis his sons and womenfolk. In fact, there is so little leeway permitted in role
performance within the family that failure to observe the
traditional etiquette is felt to call down supernatural
sanctions even when the parent chooses to overlook the
child's offense (Linton 1933:295).
Marriage in Tanala is highly regulated. Mate selection
is not free, for elder sons are expected to contract preferential marriage, and other marriages are strongly influenced by parental wishes. 15 Once entered into, marriage
is strongly binding, for divorce is "infrequent" (Kardiner
1939:260).
Tanala, like other tight societies, is marked by the presence of a relatively limited number of highly standardized roles. In Tanala this is true even of kinship roles
because there are few kinship terms and they are widely
extended in a strongly classificatory system. Even more
significant is the limitation of basic roles in the nonkinship sphere. The normal role for an adult Tanala male
is that of rice farmer. However, under the system of
primogeniture, the bulk of men, being younger sons, cannot farm in their own right. These younger sons must,
therefore, eschew the role for which they have been
trained in the family and accept an alternate cultural
role.
There are several such alternatives available for
younger sons. The blacksmith is the only highly skilled
and professional craft role. Variant roles are those of
warrior or religious specialist: the ombiasy (Linton 1933:
199 seq.) or the mpamosavy (Kardiner 1939:274-275),
a type of shaman and sorcerer respectively. Other forms
of variant behavior - neurotic seizures ( tromba) , homosexuality or transvestism (Kardiner 1939:265-266,
270-275) - serve as outlets for other younger sons.
Neurotic elements implicit in the behavior patterns associated with most of these variant roles lends weight to
the interpretation that they have a latent function of
dissipating-pent-up aggression engendered by the tightness of Tanala society.
Tanala religion is characterized by a heavy focus on
the ancestral cult and, when chastizing an erring son, a
father may threaten him with possible punishment by ancestral ghosts ( or indeed, as an ancestral ghost himself
after death). The religious system is, then, a significant
element in the punishment of deviations from norms and,
thus, important in maintaining the tightness of Tanala
society. At the same time, a rationalization for what must
be - the fact that an individual's life is so heavily determined by external forces such as birth order - is the
belief in fate and a concomitant concern with lucky and
unlucky days. This is obviously a mechanism for shunting off societally generated hostility onto an outer, nonhuman force (Kardiner 1939:270).
It is clear that Tanala exhibits not only the features of
social structure which typify the tight society, but also
the institutionalized beliefs and roles that such a society
offers as a safety valve for the intra-psychic strains its
Proceedings, Volume Thirty, No. One, 1962

social institutions generate. However, flexibility and the
avoidance of absolute tightness are seen in several features of Tanala society: the election of local chiefs, class
exogamy, partial self-determination of betrothal, and
lack of strong stress on the sororate and levirate.
What can be said of the modal personality which
mediates between the structural and "psychological" features of a tight society? The inferred modal personality
Kardiner (1939:291-354) constructs for the Tanala is
characterized by a stress on authority and an instrumental, manipulative orientation to other individuals.
This is initially established by the incongruence of long
breast feeding coupled with early anal training which
leads to a pattern of submission to authority marking
what Kardiner terms the "psychology of ingratiation"
(1939:301, 319). This pattern has the combination of
a wish for dominance, on the one hand, and a need for
submission on the other, which is the earmark of the
authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950). Reinforced throughout the life cycle of the Tanala, it generates sibling rivalry which causes brothers to compete for
the attention of the father. They seek gifts and favors
during his lifetime through ingratiation to him which
leads to a tone of manipulative instrumentality in the
fraternal relationship. Thus, an eldest son will, "by making loans to his younger brothers, keep them in debt and
subjugation" (Linton 1933:142) in order to maintain
his power over them.
This inferred modal personality is one which has a
need for inter-personal relations which are ordered according to a hierarchial principle and are basically instrumental or manipulative in character.
2. The Azande are a group of 750,000 patrilineal agriculturalists comprising numerous tribes who live in the
region of the Nile-Congo divide straddling the Sudan, the
Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.16
The Zande 17 have hereditary caste-like groups which
are more exclusive than the Tanala classes. There are
noble clans - known as the A vungara - commoner clans,
and slaves. 18 The Vungara as the ranking group are
sharply set apart by style of life and a special type of
male hypergamy. 19 Granted immunity from certain legal
sanctions and other privileges, they are ". . . men whose
superiority is never challenged and whose commands receive immediate obedience" (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 14).
This indicates the rigidity of the Zande class system, the
degree to which conformity to it is enforced, and hints
at the societally generated aggression it instills in commoners.
Political organization takes the form of a hierarchally
structured centralized state and political roles, like class
roles, are ascriptively allocated by birth. Leadership is
in the hands of the Vungara, with the top positions closed
to commoners. However, lower positions - especially that
of headman - are open to them. Extreme deference to
political superiors is shown by both Vungara (cf. Seligman and Seligman, 1932:503) and commoners, although
the latter ". . . are so used to authority that they are
docile" (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 13).
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The pattern of submission found in political behavior
has its roots in the family which is as ·patriarchical in
flavor as its Tanala counterpart, for it is ". . . characterized by the inferiority of women and authority of
elders ... The Father of a family exercised great control over his sons, who treated him with deep respect"
(Evans-Pritchard 193 7: 16).
This lays the groundwork for sibling rivalry and the
psychology of ingratiation which we observed in Tanala.
Although the Zande do not have primogeniture, the eldest
son is privileged, 20 and even in adulthood is referred to
by forms of polite address with deferential overtones
(Seligman and Seligman 1932:509). Younger sons compete with each other for their father's good will so that
he will use ceremonial spears obtained as bridewealth
for their sisters to obtain wives for them (cf. Seligman
and Seligman 1932:509). This same pattern of ingratiation and instrumentality serves the son in good stead
on later occasions. One such occasion is after he has
arranged the customary infant betrothal. He must then
supplement the transfer of spears with bride service in
which he adopts "the stereotyped, subservient attitude of
the son-in-law" (Seligman and Seligman 1932: 512). Another such occasion is when he curries favor at court in
order to gain an appointment as a headman or deputy
while, at the same time, he attaches followers to his
homestead by rewarding their ingratiation to him.
The rigidity of Zande marriage is hinted at in the
mention of infant betrothal and bride service. It is highly
regulated for it is "never based on mutual consent"
( Seligman and Seligman 1932: 514). Furthermore, once
'contracted, it is firmly binding because divorce is rare and
the practice of both the sororate and levirate mean that
even the death of a spouse does not relax the marital
bond.
It is apparent that, as a tight society, Zande compares with Tanala because there is ascriptive allocation
by birth of class and political roles; and some allocation
of family roles by birth order. Close reinforcement of
behavioral norms - especially in the socio-political sphere
- and an instrumental quality in interpersonal relations
also recur.
Farming is the normal role for an adult Zande male.
A person who cannot accommodate himself to it has
few alternatives because, as a tight society, Zande does
not offer a wide variety of standardized cultural roles.
Although the literature omits data on this point, it seems
that there are no full time craft roles available other than
that of blacksmith. Political office as an alternative to
farming is closed to all but Vungara and wealthy commoners. The sole variant role available is that of witch
doctor. Evans-Pritchard's descriptions . of seances conducted by these men suggests that a successful practitioner must have at least mild hysterical tendencies. The
role has satisfactions, however, for "(The witch doctor)
is ... a man who commands respect . . . (and) the
most important incentives are desire to obtain medicines
and display one's self" (Evans-Pritchard 1937:256).
These comments on the satisfactions of being a witch
doctor are especially relevant when one notes that the
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role is reserved for commoners as it is considered demeaning for a Vungara ( or even a commoner of political
note). The satisfactions of the witch doctor role are, thus,
largely compensatory, suiting those of depressed status by
giving theni some prestige, power over omnipresent
witches, and an opportunity to display behavior usually
forbidden (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937:169).
Although it provides very few variant roles, Zande
social structure, like that of Tanala, provides several
other channels for systematic dissipation of institutionally
generated strain.
One such mode which is striking was the presence,
until recently, of institutionalized homosexuality in the
military and labor cadres (Seligman and Seligman 1932:
506).
Those who have written of Zande religion, especially
Evans-Pritchard ( 1937), have indicated the seemingly
small role played by other aspects of religion as compared to magic and witchcraft. The pattern of Zande
witchcraft accusations shows that kinsmen and Vungara
are exempt. This is because to accuse one's kinsmen implicates one's self and Vungara are too powerful to confront with such thinly veiled enmity. Thus, witchcraft
accusations can serve as only a limited way of dissipating
societally generated friction.
Sorcery is also present in Zandeland, although it is
severely punished when discovered. Thus, it, too, is limited as a tension-dissipating mechanism. However, the
Zande belief in fate which takes the form of many types
of oracles is, like the parallel belief in Tanala, a palliative for those whose lives are so much determined by
birth.
The last outlet for pent-up tension is secret societies
for the practice of magic. Membership is made up largely
of those with depressed social status in the society women, commoners and younger sons - working together
against authority. The tension alleviating and compensatory functions of these societies needs no elaboration (cf.
Baxter and Butt 1953:91-93).
It is possible to deduce an inferred modal personality
for the Zande, although without further information on
child training it is not possible to lay bare its genetic
roots. 21 From the published reports it is clear that both
major dimensions of the Tanala personality are also
found in the Zande modal personality. First, there is submissiveness to authority and a preference for interpersonal relations with a hierarchical, highly regulated cast.
The authoritarian pattern of the father-son relationship of
Tanala is found in Zande, although the pattern is even
stronger in the Vungara-commoner relationship which
affects much of the daily intercourse of the average
Zande. Secondly, the instrumentality and manipulation
which is a consequence of the psychology of ingratiation
is also very much present; again, more in socio-political
relations than in the family. This instrumental cast to
Zande life was observed by Larken who writes " ... the
more they (wives) are, the greater is (a man's) food
supply, and the higher his position in the eyes of his
fellows, who are apt to esteem a person in proportion to
what they can get out of him" (Larken 1926: 16) .22
The Minnesota Academy of Science

In sum, Zande society, like Tanala society, exhibits
the earmarks of a tightly structured society and, also like
Tanala, an inferred moda~ personality whose traits reflect
the institutional structure of such a society.
BLOOD-BROTHERHOOD IN TANALA AND AzANDE: Past
theoretical discussions of blood-brotherhood have begun
with the question of whether or not it is qualitatively different from a real kinship tie. Earlier theorists argued
that because all ties in a primitive society are those of
blood, any new relationship has to be a simulated kinship relationship. This derived from their belief that nonliterate peoples think of kinship physiologically, in terms
of common blood (cf. Tegnaeus, 1952 and Evans-Pritchard, 1933). More recent writers have focused less, on
the "blood" and more on the quality of the "brotherhood." Kardiner, analyzing the Tanala material, sees real
brotherhood as marked by rivalry and blood-brotherhood
as marked by "fidelity," thereby compensating for the
strains of real siblinghood. Evans-Pritchard sees real
brotherhood as characterized by social obligations, while
blood-brotherhood is marked by legal obligations. Both
positions are correct as far as they go,_ but it is mo_re
fruitful to analyze blood-brotherhood m terms of its
functions.
In both Tanala and Zande, as practically everywhere
blood-brotherhood is characterized first by instrumental
functions. 23 Blood-brotherhood in Tanala is called mifanagena and the two men who enter the relationship
share property; sometimes wives (if they live a great
distance apart); help with each others funerals and so
on. Zande blood brothers, called bakure, incur similar
obligations, although they eschew any relations with each
others' wives in favor of an option to engage each others'
daughters. This instrumental function is probably not the
most crucial one, however, for duties incurred are usually those which may also be performed by kinsmen,
affines or other persons who are not blood brothers (cf.
Cohen 1961 :372).
Tanala and Zande blood-brotherhood also serves an
integrative function, again, a function of blood-brotherhood in many types of societies. Blood-brothers in Tanala
are from different families or, sometimes, different lineages and even from different classes. Among the Zande,
they are from different clans, but usually of the same
class. In both societies, they are often of different localities. It is clear that the institution of blood-brotherhood
forges links between individuals and groups that might
not otherwise occur, links that cross-cut pre-existing
ones, bind the society closer together and smother intergroup conflicts (cf. Eisenstadt 1956:92).
In most societies there are areas in which the behavior
to follow is poorly defined or even governed by clashing
norms. Eisenstadt has pointed out that, in such a case,
an ambiguously or poorly defined duty may be allocated
to those who enter a pact of blood-brotherhood. 24 This
gives blood-brotherhood as its thi~d fu~ction the ~e_d~ction of role conflict or anomie, m bnef, a stab1hzmg
function.
Examining these three functions of blood-brotherhoo_d
it is clear that their relative importance varies from soc1Proceedings, Volume Thirty, No. One, 1962

ety to society although it is possible that all three functions might be met iti one society. Blood-brotherhood
seems to serve instrumental and integrative functions
wherever it is found. In fact, the instrumental functions
are usually recognized and given explicit mention by native informants themselves. However, this writer holds
that the stabilizing function which Eisenstadt notes is
significant only in societies which can be demonstrated
to be loosely structured. 25
It may be suggested that a fourth function of bloodbrotherhood, is a socio-psychological function, which is
characteristic of blood-brotherhood in tightly structured
societies. Accordingly, the type of blood-brotherhood
found in such societies should be distinguished from
other forms which give greatest weight to one of the
other functions. To document this let us examine the
features of Tanala and Zande blood-brotherhood more
analytically.
Cohen (1961: 3 74) is correct in holding that bloodbrotherhood in any society will have the flavor of other
interpersonal relations in that society. Thus, while bloodbrotherhood in Tanala and Zande carries many duties,
they are precisely defined and marked by clear-cut sanctions. In Tanala the ombiasy who conducts the ceremony
of blood-brotherhood recites the obligations and duties
which are the conditions of the oaths and the sanctions
which will follow their breach, viz. : "May leprosy eat
away his fingers and toes" (Linton 1932:309). Zande
blood-brotherhood is also backed by supernatural sanctions as well as by secular ones. There, a defaulting
blood-brother must face strong public disapproval and
censure. Ritual brotherhood in both societies is tightly
structured and not easily broken. 26
Although blood-brotherhood has the flavor of other
relationships in a tight society, it is unlike these relationships in several significant ways. Most of the other relationships in such a society are allocated to the individual
on the basis of ascriptive criteria such as sex, age and
birth order - qualities which are not unique to the individual. They are relationships which are neither sought,
nor entered voluntarily.
Blood-brotherhood is, in contrast, a voluntary relationship which is freely entered into by each partner. It
is achieved, hence the need for a ceremony to establish
the bond. More important is the fact that a blood-brother
chooses his partner on the basis of a particularistic quality, one which is unique to him. Blood-brothers choose
each other because they like each other. The Tanala characterize the relationship as closer than any natural relationship, for "persons who have taken the oath are considered more closely related than even the children of
the same mother ..." (Linton 1933:307). In Zandeland, it is marked by "deep affection" (Seligman and
Seligman 1932: 510), affection indicated also by joking,
an activity which is not usually tolerated. The nature of
blood-brotherhood in both societies is evidently parallel
to that reported by Okada for the Nepalese:
"In Nepal the predominant reason for entering into
ritual brotherhood is mutual affection between the participants and their desire to strengthen and formalize
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the ties of their relationship. Naturally the advantages
of mutual aid are not overlooked but, in the main, the
emotional reason is primary. Many informants stated
simply: "I liked him" when asked why they had taken
a mit . . . " (Okada 1957:214).
The most outstanding feature of Tanala and Zande
blood-brotherhood is, then, that it is affective. Because
affectivity does not lend itself as a criterion of role ascription, this form of relationship is voluntary, achieved and
particularistic. The primacy of the giving and receiving
of emotional support over the performance of instrumental duties is especially clear in the Tanala material. 27
There, blood-brotherhood is often entered into by two
parallel cousins who, as kinsmen, are already obligated
to aid each other in much the same way as bloodbrothers.
While blood-brotherhood in both societies is highly
contractual and so ringed around with sanctions as to
be virtualy irrevocable, it is also compulsively equal and
reciprocal. The stress on the equality of the relationship
begins with the ceremony. In Zandeland the two bloodbrothers cut gashes on each other's chests or arms and
smear their blood on bits of wood which are exchanged,
swallowed and addressed in each others stomachs. Other
substances may be used such as two peanuts from the
same pod. Here, equality and exact reciprocity are clearly
symbolized as they are in the Tanala ceremony which is
similar. A listing of duties and sanctions which follow
the swallowing of blood in each society's ceremony underscores the focus on these qualities.
The compulsive emphasis on equality in the ritual also
marks the ensuing behavior of the partners. Although
blood-brothers perform tasks for each other, each task
or duty must, in time, be scrupulously repaid. By keeping
the balance sheet in order, the partnership is protected
from encroaching instrumentality, from the scrambling
for self-advantage that marks other relationships. 28 Linton states that he never heard of the Tanala relationship
being used for political purposes or personal gain. Although others in the society may be manipulated as
means to various ends - a bequest of land, a wife, a
headmanship - a blood-brother is not to be so used.
(This argument is reinforced by the observation that
blood-brotherhood is sheltered from the potentially disturbing effect of unregulated or frequent sexual liaisons.)
The writer proposes that blood-brotherhood in these
tightly structured societies be called compensatory bloodbrotherhood because in its affective focus, voluntary nature, and compulsive reciprocity, it gives expression to
personal qualities and needs which are stifled by the social structure. 29 Blood-brotherhood does more than compensate for the rivalry of the sibling bond, as Kardiner
has suggested; it compensates for a whole host of societally generated strains in such societies. Most individuals
in such a society have ascribed to them a series of roles
which may not allow expression of their unique temperament or goals. These are roles in which they are dominated by the wishes and goals of others, and by modal
personality mechanisms headed by the dominance-sub72

mission syndrome and the instrumentality of the psychology of ingratiation.
Compensatory blood-brotherhood is a kind of dyadic
haven where the individual enters into a symmetrical relationship which is not ascribed to him, in which his
goals and wishes are equal to those of the other party
and in which he is valued in terms of personal qualities
peculiar to him, not in terms of some universalistic criterion. 30 Such an hypothesis rests on the proposition documented earlier, that the tight society produces a latent
modal personality need to be valued for one's self. 31
One merit of this type of hypothesis is that it not only
explains the presence of compensatory blood-brotherhood in Tanala and Azande, but also explains the difference between the relationship in the two societies. In
Tanala, the primary rivalries are within the kin group,
especially between younger brothers. The bond of ritual
brotherhood there is most commonly formed between
those who are already classificatory brothers, i.e. parallel
cousins of different lineages. In Zandeland the major rivalries are between commoners, non-kinsmen of the same
social class. There, blood-brotherhood is entered into almost entirely by commoners and it is forbidden to kinsmen who are members of the same clan. 32 The hypothesis
is thus further verified by the demonstration that bloodbrotherhood is most sought after by those who are most
directly in competition and most regulated by the heavy
ascription of the tight society. 33
Previous observers of this type of blood-brotherhood
have noted that it is strongly institutionalized and highly
valued in the societies in which it is found. The present
hypothesis indicates why. In meeting the needs it does,
it is functionally crucial and this is demonstrated by the
buttressing of the denial of reciprocity and other diffuse
sanctions by supernatural and ritual sanctions. Another
indicator of high value is the fact that the obligations to
the blood-brother may be placed above those to the chief
as representative of the state. Thus, a Zande bloodbrother seeking to avoid justice is to be supported regardless of the risk or alternative loyalty.
It is clear that blood-brotherhood is but one of several
socio-psychological release mechanisms found in tight
societies. It can be classed along with the provision of
other institutionalized - and variant - roles. However it
differs from these other mechanisms in some signific~nt
respects. It is basically a "healthy" relationship, relatively free from neurotic tendencies and probably attracts
"normal" individuals rather than those whose role strain
is acute. Those individuals have their needs met by the
role of shaman, transvestite, homosexual and the like.
It is not novel to suggest that blood-_brotherhood as a
form of institutionalized friendship has a strain reducing
function. Eisenstadt (1956: 93) calls the stabilizing or
role conflict reducing function "strain reducing," but in
his approach, which is almost exclusively sociological, it
is not clear that the strain is not a strain somehow lodged
within the interstices of the social system. By introducing
the concept of modal personality as an intervening variable a more accurate picture emerges from the data, for it
becomes clear that the strains dissipated by ritualized
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friendship are strains systematically generated within individuals by the social system in which they participate.
By making sensible the paradoxical juxtaposition of
warm comradely bonds and a highly contractual and formal ceremony, this analysis lifts some of the romantic
aura which envelops much thinking about blood-brotherhood. To further the task we need to examine ritualized
friendship in other types of societies more closely in
order to delineate additional sub-types. Finally, to remove the last traces of misplaced exoticism, in future
field studies we need to obtain not only much more
quantifiable data on exchanges between blood-brothers
and their day-to-day behavior but more complete observations on friendship in general. Our long flirtation with
Kinship has blinded us to the enticements of Friendship.
NOTES
1

This paper is an outgrowth of a seminar on comparative
interpersonal relations conducted at Harvard University by Cora
DuBois. I am particularly grateful for the insightful comments
of Dr. DuBois. I would like to acknowledge the criticisms and
suggestions of the other participants in the seminar. Daniel J.
Levinson, Robert S. Merrill, and E. Adamson Hoebel have also
read an earlier draft of this paper and offered many stimulating
comments and suggestions. This draft was prepared while the
writer was the holder of a Faculty Summer Research Appointment in the University of Minnesota Graduate School.
2
Stimulating general treatments of these relationships and citations of ethnographic reports are found in Eisenstadt (1956)
and Cohen (1961). Tegnaeus (1952) offers a very complete
compilation of descriptions of blood-brotherhood practices in
Africa and draws on Evans-Pritchard (1933) for conceptual
statements.
3
I use the same definition of institutionalization as Eisenstadt:
"~upported by some of the most important and severe, usually
ntual sanctions of the society" (Eisenstadt 1956 :90).
4
cf. Evans-Pritchard ( 1933), Eisenstadt ( 1956) and Cohen
(1961).
5
cf. Cohen (1961:354).
• The latter writers, concerned with the loosely structured polar
type defined it as marked by: (1) the presence of norms which
may be met by alternative behavior patterns, all of which are
acceptable, (2) the tolerance of behavior which is acknowledoed
as violating norms, and (3) lack of high valuation of gr;up
goals or group organization; and hence, subordination of the
individual to the group (Ryan and Strauss 1954). A tightly structured society is not analyzed by these writers, but presumably,
they feel that it has the opposite features. The two kinds of
societies are not discrete and non-overlapping, but obviously
form two poles on a continuum along which empirical societies
may be placed.
7
For brevity I will use the terms "tight society" and "loose
society" instead of the more precise and elegant "tightly structured society," etc.
8
I have also used the same scheme in an analysis of marital
stability, "Marital Instability among the Kpe!le: Towards a The- ·
ory of Epainogamy" (in press: American Anthropologist).
0
The analysis here pertains to the Menabe tribe.
10
This material is summarized by Linton in a chapter in
Kardiner (19 39) .
11
The eldest son receives one-half of the residual estate remaining after one-third of his father's property has been given
to the deceased man's first (or only) wife.
12
This is seen i~ the use of special kinship terms by parents
and younger siblings for the oldest child of each sex.
13
An example is the strong feeling against cross-generational
alliances, even in taking plural wives.
14
There are three classes differentiated more in terms of prestige than economic grounds.
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15
•
A union. must be approved by a couple's parents and by the
village council, although a couple may make the initial arrangements themselves.
10
For clarity I have written the following account in the present,,tense althoug~ the time ~eferred to is the "ethnographic present . of the 192? s at the time both Evans-Pritchard (who has
published extensively on the Azande) and the Seligmans conducted their field work among them.
17
In the remainder of the paper I will, following recent usage,
dr~f the prefix and refer to this group simply as the Zande.
There is also an amorphous group of Abomu conquerers
inte~mediate between Avungara and commoners. They accompa~1ed th~ A vungara in their conquests of new regions and
claimed higher status than those conquered because of their ties
at court.
10
While a Vungara man will often marry a commoner woman
w~o will bear children of Vungara status, a Vungara woman
will marry a commoner man only if she can retain the privileges
of her rank and the right to take lovers as she chooses.
20
He receives the bridewealth of one of his sisters from his
father and can marry earlier than his younger brothers. This is
particularly significant because in Zande society marriage is customarily very late.
2
l We are told that children are nursed until they are three or
four, but we have no information on toilet training or other early
disciplines.
22
Italics are mine.
23
cf. note 4 above for the main descriptive analyses of bloodbrotherhood.
· "'". . . the different types of 'ritual kinship' and compadrazgo
are usually established between the members of those groups
between whom there exists a relatively wide scope of relatively
~nstructured interaction, or, in other words, they are established
m those areas of interaction which may give rise to certain undefined situations and consequent tensions . . . . Moreover, the exact contents of the obligations within these types of relationships
seems also . . . to vary according to the nature of the specific
sphere of potentially unregulated and undefined situations and
interrelations" (Eisenstadt 1956:93).
25
Cf. Eisenstadt ( 1956:93). Eisenstadt and I would differ in
our categorization of Tanala and Zande society. He stresses the
loos~ness _of their role behavior, noting, for example, that the
relat10nsh1p between a Zande commoner and a Vungara is not
precisely defined. I argue that the commoner knows that he must
be deferential and obedient even though each type of command
or duty is not specifically laid down in advance, thus leaving the
content of the behavior somewhat open. The content ambiguity
makes the obedience no less compelling and probably the more
chafing.
2
°Cohen stresses these same points in terming blood-brotherhood "inalienable friendship" (1961:352) and noting that it is
found particularly in societies which he calls "maximally solidary," i.e., those with an associated world view which "pictures
human relationships as permanent, intense and irrevocable"
(1961:354).
21
Eisenstadt (1956), commenting on an earlier version of this
paper states that I have held that the blood-brotherhood relationship is "purely 'affective'" (p. 90). I feel that he misunderstood
my position which remains the same, but, perhaps, is more clearly
stated here. I do not deny that the relationship is instrumental,
but feel that this is not its most significant attribute.
2S Here there is a seemingly marked contrast with the dyadic
contract (such as the compadrazgo relationship) of Meso-American communities analyzed by Foster (1961). There, a "functional requirement of the system is that an exactly even balance
between the two partners never be struck" even though there is
a "long range of equivalence of value, not formally calculated
yet somehow weighed . . ." (1961, p. 1185)." In Mexico an
evening of accounts is avoided because it terminates the relationship. It seems that the blood-brotherhood tie is so strong that
balancing the books reinforces and validates the tie. This interpretation is somewhat tenuous, however, because Evans-Pritchard
and Linton provide little quantitative material on exchanges be-
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tween blood-brothers. One would logically expect blood-brothers
to stress long-run equivalence, too, by way of avoiding the instrumental competition of everyday relationships.
2
' This view of the compensatory relationship is analagous to
one taken with regard to the Nunivak Eskimo. Speaking of
"serious partnerships," Margaret Lantis (1945:250) writes: "Supposedly, too, "in the intimacy of such a relationship, one could
express oneself freely without fear that every statement would
be ridiculed as so often happened in other situations."
30
As a relationship of institutionalized individuality, this form
of blood-brotherhood is a reaction to Durkheim's altruistic situation where the individual is over-integrated into society
31
Cohen (1961:376) minimizes this element which he terms
"emotional support." In the view of this writer it weakens his
analysis somewhat.
"'It is, thus, forbidden to all Vungara who are supposedly
members of the same clan and on the basis of this tie thus owe·
each other the services that blood-brothers render each other.
33
I feel that this factor is more important in explaining compensatory blood-brotherhood than the fact that the norms regulating the behavior between the relevant categories of individuals
may be somewhat ambiguous. (cf. Cohen 1961 :372 and Eisenstadt 1956:92-94). In fact, the ambiguity of the norms undoubtedly increases the intensity of the competition and, hence, the
need for blood-brotherhood.
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